

Designing Antitrust for the Digital Era Brasilia, 1 August 2019

Anticompetitive effects and the digital economy

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(speaking in a personal capacity - the views expressed are not necessarily those of the European Commission)



What are "digital markets"?

- Firms supply digital goods or digital services to their customers, for example:
 - Operating systems
 - Applications for smart mobile devices and the stores for their distribution
 - Search engines
 - Social networks
 - Provision of digital content through websites or software



Possible features of digital markets

- Innovation
- Multi-sided nature
- High fixed costs, marginal costs close to zero
- Network effects (both direct and indirect)
- Winner-takes-all effects



Which analysis of effects in digital markets?


- Important not to generalise each market is different
- But as rule of thumb, enforcers in digital markets can look at same sources of evidence as in other areas:
 - Qualitative factors (e.g. internal documents, market surveys)
 - Quantitative analysis (e.g. AEC-like test)



Example 1:

Google Shopping





Grills - Gas - Parts & Support - Charcoal


www.nextag.de/Gas-Grills -Erstklassige Gas-Grills in vielen Varianten: Hier zum Niedrigpreis!




Link between visibility and traffic

- Clear link between visibility and format in Google's general search results and click-through behaviour: shown by a range of empirical data. Link between:
 - Trigger rate of Shopping Unit traffic to Google Shopping
 - Visibility of rivals and traffic to them
- Results that are higher and in a more visible format attract significantly more clicks than those that are lower or beyond the first page
- On average, rivals are on the fourth page as good as being virtually invisible
- Google was aware of this link











Evidence from internal documents

Froogle "unlikely to appear high in the search results"

"In my opinion, Froogle isn't really a serious contender today"

"Froogle simply doesn't work"

"it would be good if we could actually just crawl our product pages and then have the[m] rank organically (...) Problem is that today if we crawl it will never rank".


"(1) [t]he [Froogle] pages may not get crawled without special treatment; without enough pagerank or other quality signals, the content may not get crawled. (2) If it gets crawled, the same reasons are likely to keep it from being indexed; (3) If it gets indexed, the same reasons are likely to keep it from showing up (high) in search results. [...] We'd probably have to provide a lot of special treatment to this content in order to have it be crawled, indexed, and rank well"




Example 2:

Google Android





- Google developed its business model in the PC environment, where the web browser is core entry point of Internet
- In mid '00, improvements in the Internet industry began to shift its focus from PCs to smart mobile devices






Analysis of tying

- Evidence on pre-installation:
 - OEMs: limited interest in duplicating apps (transaction cost, user experience, exclusivity impossible for competitors)
 - Users: downloads of rival search and browser apps do not counteract the pre-installation advantage
 - Google's market shares on devices where Search was not preinstalled are systematically lower than those on devices where Search was pre-installed (e.g. in 2016 95% vs 25% on Android vs MSFT devices)
- Market share developments consistent with incentives:
 - Penetration of Google Search higher on mobile than desktop
 - □ Chrome grew faster on mobile than desktop



Market shares trends



Google share of search queries in Europe per type of device 100 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 010-04 010-10 13-10 01-600 014-10 10-600 ģ 10-010 011-04 01-110 012-10 2013-04 015-10 0-600 0-010 0-110 0-110 8 9 6 013-01 013-01 014-01 0.14-04 014-07 015-01 9 é ē 9 é 8 016-0 012 015-016-2016 017-015

PCs — Smartphones — Tablet



Analysis of revenue sharing payments

- Assessed as exclusivity payments
- Effects analysis outlines harmful effects
 - Contemporaneous evidence shows that OEMs/MNOs would have wished to pre-install competing search services, but were deterred by RSAs (combination with MADA)
 - Quantitative analysis shows that competitors with the same costs would have been unable to match the Google payments
 - Portfolio effect: meaning that if a customer wanted to launch just one device with a rival pre-installed, it would lose the revenue share across all devices
 - Downloading of rivals by consumers not a realistic constraint



- Anticompetitive effects in digital markets are not as such different from anticompetitive effects in other markets
- Sources of evidence to satisfy burden of proof are the same as in other sectors – qualitative tools can be as important as quantitative tools
- Theory of harm guides competitive analysis e.g. competitors' market shares trends can be highly informative in markets with network effects and tipping
- Focus on price effects can be misleading and unduly limit the analysis – non-price effects do matter!